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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Toby Glenn Weatherly appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
after a jury found him guilty of grand theft and possession of a financial
transaction card. Weatherly claims, for the first time on appeal, that his right to
be free from double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted of both grand
theft and criminal possession of a financial transaction card.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Weatherly with one count of grand theft and one count
of criminal possession of a financial transaction card, with a sentencing
enhancement alleging Weatherly was a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.5457, 81-83.)

A jury found Weatherly guilty of both counts as well as finding he

had previously been convicted of two felonies. (R., pp.125, 165; JT Tr., p.198,
Ls.15-24, p.207, L.23 - p.208, L.7.) The court retained jurisdiction for up to 365
days with underlying concurrent unified 5-year sentences with one-year fixed on
each count.

(R., pp.164-167; 11/25/14 Tr., p.28, Ls.3-20.)

timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.171-17 4, 179-183.)

1

Weatherly filed a

ISSUE
Weatherly states the issue on appeal as:
Was Mr. Weatherly twice placed in jeopardy for the same
offense when he was convicted of and sentenced for both the
greater offense of grand theft of a financial transaction card and the
lesser-included offense of possession of a financial transaction
card?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Weatherly failed to demonstrate fundamental error based on his claim
that he could not be convicted and sentenced for both grand theft and criminal
possession of a financial transaction card?
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ARGUMENT
Weatherly Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error Based On His Double
Jeopardy Claim
A.

Introduction
Weatherly contends, for the first time on appeal, that "his rights under the

Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Idaho Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution were violated" when a jury found him guilty of both
grand theft and criminal possession of a financial transaction card. (Appellant's
brief, p.5.) Weatherly however, failed to raise this claim below, and has failed to
show that it constitutes fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245
P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review.
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000).

The

interpretation and application of a statute is also a question of law subject to de
novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct. App.
2011 ).
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C.

Weatherly Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In Relation To His
Double Jeopardy Claim
"There are two theories under which a particular offense may be

determined to be a lesser included of a charged offense." State v. SanchezCastro, 157 Idaho 647, 648, 339 P.3d 372, 373 (2012) (quoting State v. Curtis,
130 Idaho 522, 524, 944 P.2d 119, 121 (1997)). Those theories are referred to
as the statutory theory and the pleading theory. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at
648, 339 P.3d at 373 (citations omitted).

Idaho appellate courts apply the

Blockburger1 test in analyzing whether an offense is an included offense under
the statutory theory.

!st (citing State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 261 P.3d

519, 521 (2011)). Under this test, an offense is considered included in another
offense "if all the elements required to sustain a conviction of the lesser included
offense are included within the elements needed to sustain a conviction of the
greater offense." Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527, 261 P.3d at 521 (quoting State v.
McCormick, 100 Idaho 111,114,594 P.2d 149,152 (1979)).
Weatherly concedes on appeal that he did not preserve below his
argument that double jeopardy, under either the United States or Idaho
Constitutions, precluded his convictions for both grand theft and possession of a
financial transaction card. (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Despite his failure to preserve
the issue, Weatherly argues that his claims constitute fundamental error.
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) Weatherly is incorrect.
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Weatherly to
demonstrate the error he alleges:

1

"(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived

Named after Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
4

constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
In State v. Corbus, the Idaho Court of Appeals conducted its first postPerry fundamental error analysis of unpreserved double jeopardy claims made
under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368,
256 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2011).
conviction.

kl

The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Corbus'

The Court first concluded that under the Blockburger statutory

theory, utilized by the Supreme Court of the United States in analyzing double
jeopardy claims made under the United States Constitution, reckless driving was
not a lesser included offense of felony eluding. Corbus, 151 Idaho at 372-74,
256 P.3d at 780-82.

Corbus had therefore failed, the Court concluded, to

demonstrate that his United States Constitutional double jeopardy rights were
violated (first prong of Perry).
Second, while recognizing that reckless driving and felony eluding were
the same offense for double jeopardy purposes pursuant to the alternative
"pleading theory" utilized in some jurisdictions, the Court held that because it was
unclear which theory actually applied under the Idaho Constitution, Corbus could
not show "plain error" by relying solely on the pleading theory (second prong of
Perry). Corbus, 151 Idaho at 372-7 4, 256 P.3d at 780-82 (recognizing that the
second prong of the Perry test, which requires that the error "plainly exists,"
necessitates that the appellant show that existing authorities have unequivocally
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resolved the issue in the appellant's favor). The analysis in the present case is
nearly identical, and Weatherly has thus failed to show fundamental error on
either his federal or state double jeopardy claim.
1.

United States Double Jeopardy Constitutional Claim

In Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985), the United States
Supreme Court reiterated that the Blockburger, or "statutory" test, is the proper
method of determining whether the legislature intended the commission of two
crimes to be separately punishable under the United States Constitution:
This Court has consistently relied on the test of statutory
construction stated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), to determine whether
Congress intended the same conduct to be punishable under two
criminal provisions. The appropriate inquiry under Blockburger is
"whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not." ... The assumption underlying the Blockburger rule is
that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense
under two different statutes.
See also Corbus, 151 Idaho at 372-74, 256 P.3d at 780-82 (recognizing that the
Blockburger rule applied to Corbus' United States Constitution double jeopardy
claim).
Contrary to Weatherly's argument on appeal, possession of a financial
transaction card is not a lesser included offense of grand theft under the
Blockburger statutory theory, and Weatherly has thus failed to meet the first
prong of the Perry analysis, that "one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional
rights were violated."
The elements of criminal possession of a financial transaction card, as
charged in the present case, are: (1) the acquisition of a financial transaction
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card without the consent of the cardholder; and (2) the intent to use the financial
transaction card to defraud. See I.C. § 18-3125(1); ICJI 822. The elements of
grand theft as charged in this case are: (1) the taking or exercise of control over

or the transfer of a property interest in a financial transaction card; (2) the owner
did not authorize the defendant's action; and (3) the defendant had the intent to
deprive the owner of property. See I.C. §§ 18-2403(3), 18-2407(b)(3); ICJI 551.
Specifically, Weatherly was charged with grand theft by using the financial
transaction

card belonging to his brother and sister-in-law to make an

unauthorized transfer. (R., pp.56-57.)
The crime of criminal possession of a financial transaction card (l.C. § 183125(1 )), requires the intent to defraud, while the crime grand theft (I.C. §§ 182403(3), 18-2407(b)(3)), does not - the latter crime may be committed by a
person who, for example, obtains a financial transaction card with the intent to
deprive the owner of the card but does not have the intent to use the financial
transaction card to defraud. Grand theft as Weatherly was charged here (I.C. §§
18-2403(3), 18-2407(b)(3)), requires the transfer of a property interest in the
financial transaction card (or, as here, the ultimate use of the card to obtain funds
from an ATM), while the crime of criminal possession of a financial transaction
card (l.C. § 18-3125(1)), does not - the latter crime may be committed even if
there is no actual use of the financial transaction card. Thus, criminal possession
of a financial transaction card is not a lesser included offense of grand theft
under the statutory, or Blockburger test.
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At best, had Weatherly raised this issue below, he could have made a
plausible argument that one cannot steal a financial transaction card without
possessing it, and that criminal possession of a financial transaction card is thus
a lesser included offense of grand theft. However, even if he had made such an
argument, Weatherly could not show fundamental error under the second prong
of the Perry analysis. The state has found no case where an Idaho appellate
court has specifically considered the issue of whether grand theft of a financial
transaction card necessarily constitutes criminal possession of a financial
transaction card. With no Idaho caselaw on point, Weatherly cannot show "plain
error," i.e. that "existing authorities have unequivocally resolved the issue in the
appellant's favor," under the second prong of the Perry analysis. See Corbus,
151 Idaho at 372-375, 256 P.3d at 780-84.
Criminal possession of a financial transaction card is not a lesser included
offense of grand theft under the Blockburger test because each crime requires an
element that the other does not. Even if Weatherly could have presented some
argument that the two crimes at issue were in fact "the same crime" pursuant to a
Blockburger analysis, he cannot show "plain error" in light of the lack of
precedent.

Weatherly has thus failed to show fundamental error under the

double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.
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2.

Idaho Double Jeopardy Constitutional Claim

Weatherly also argues for the first time on appeal a violation of his double
jeopardy rights under a "pleadings" analysis.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.)

In

support of this argument, Weatherly argues he "was charged by information with
one count of grand theft and one count of possession of a financial transaction
card, both arising from his possession and one time use of a single prepaid cash
card.

(Appellant's brief, p.11 (citation to the record omitted).)
Idaho is among several jurisdictions which have, at least occasionally,

utilized the "pleading theory" to determine whether the conviction

and

punishment for two offenses violates the double jeopardy clause of respective
state constitutions.

See Corbus, 151 Idaho at 372-375, 256 P.3d at 780-84.

Under the "pleading theory," a court must consider whether the terms of the
charging document allege that both offenses arose from the same factual
circumstance such that one offense was the means by which the other was
committed.

ls!.

Because the pleading theory relies on an examination of the

charging Information, it generally provides a broader definition of greater and
lesser included offenses than a statutory theory approach.

ls!.

However, as the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized in Corbus, while the
Idaho Supreme Court has utilized the pleading theory in the past, it has not done
so consistently. In fact, contrary to Weatherly's conclusory assertion on appeal
that "Idaho has adopted the broader 'pleading theory"' with regard to double
jeopardy analysis (Appellant's brief, p.11 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals has
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recognized that the Idaho Constitution's double jeopardy jurisprudence is
anything but clear:
Our review of the Idaho Supreme Court cases including
[State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 234 P.3d 707 (2010); State v.
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991); Sivak v. State, 112
Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1986); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho
430, 614 P.2d 970 (1980)] demonstrates the available authority
does not provide a clear answer to the question of which analytical
theory should be applied in double jeopardy cases which allege a
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho Constitution.
It is not clear from existing precedent whether the Blockburger test,
the pleading theory used in Thompson, or the pleading theory used
in Stewart, Pizzuto, and Sivak should properly be applied in this
case. In addition, application of each of these theories would result
in contradictory conclusions. Therefore, Corbus has failed, under
the second prong of the Perry test, to show fundamental error with
regard to his double jeopardy claim which arises under the Idaho
Constitution.
Consequently, we will not further consider this
argument on appeal.
Corbus, 151 Idaho at 375, 256 P.3d at 784.
Similarly, Weatherly's Idaho Constitutional double jeopardy claim fails the
second prong of a Perry analysis. Weatherly cannot, as he attempts to do, rely
on the more forgiving "pleading theory" and show "plain error" under the second
prong of Perry, because it is not at all clear whether the "pleading theory" even
applies under the Idaho Constitution.

Corbus, 151 Idaho at 373, 256 P.3d at

781 (The Perry requirement that the error plainly exists necessitates that the
appellant show that existing authorities have unequivocally resolved the issue in
the appellant's favor.). A defendant who maintains that the "pleading theory" is
indeed the law in Idaho must first raise the issue to the district court.
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Weatherly has failed to show fundamental error with regard to either his
United States or Idaho Constitutional double jeopardy claims.

As such, this

Court should thus affirm his convictions.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Weatherly's convictions
and sentences for both grand theft and criminal possession of a financial
transaction card.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of November, 2015, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Pu
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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